Japan's Counter Intelligence Operation in Newly-Independent Pakistan
A historical deep dive into Operation Takematsu
Not long after achieving Independence from the British Raj in 1947, a nascent Pakistan had extended its arms to embrace economic and cultural cooperation with the US. Statements of solidarity against Communism and enthusiasm for private sector enterprise, by Pakistani Commerce and Finance Ministers respectively, managed to attract the attention of the Truman regime.
The Pakistani government at the time may have taken inspiration from US grant of military aid to Greece and Turkey on the pretext of countering the spread of Communism. It was no surprise, therefore, that Pakistan's pioneering diplomatic staffers in Washington D.C. approached then US Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, seeking economic aid for reconstruction and development, including loans for rehabilitation of immigrants from India. Acheson, as we know, was the principal architect of the 'Truman Doctrine' which faciliated aid programmes to both Mediterranean countries.
Additionally, several bureaucrats in Pakistan's government were pro-US in their outlook (except Khawaja Nazimuddin) well before Partition; prominent among them was Malik Ghulam Mohammed, Pakistani Finance Minister and later Governor General. While Pakistan would hold reservations on the US' abstinence from taking sides on the Kashmir dispute, it was open to the idea of expanding its poor industrial base. This is where international trade opportunities presented themselves on various occasions, including from a postwar/ Occupied Japan that was functioning under General Douglas MacArthur-led Supreme Command for Allied powers in the Pacific (SCAP).
In February 1946, within a few months after MacArthur oversaw the demobilisation of the Imperial Japanese military, he was directed to authorise Japan's re-entry to the global markets by allowing foreign trade. However, the SCAP conditioned Japanese trade strictly on a non-competitive barter basis and application of Potsdam standards as in Germany. Postwar Japan was permitted exports only to prevent disease and unrest, carry out SCAP missions or sustain a minimum Japanese economy.
MacArthur had appointed Brigadier (later Major General) Charles A. Willoughby as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence) who would oversee the operations of multiple components including the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment in Japan. When MacArthur led an advance party to Japan in August 1945, among those who welcomed him was Lieutenant General Arisue Seizō who was reputedly a 'clever turncoat' and would go to pretend subservience to SCAP for the discreet ulterior motive of restoring a postwar Japan's defeated military.
Arisue was G-2 Chief in the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) General Staff and made himself dependable for Willoughby, not simply through his vast network of veterans and operatives but also taking advantage of the fact that he spoke German (Willoughby's father was German and he was proud of his German heritage). Arisue introduced him further to Lieutenant General Kawabe Torashirō, his former colleague from IJA General Staff who had prior experience of covert operations in northern Europe.
In April 1948, prewar Japan's Army Minister and later Foreign Minister General Ugaki Kazunari (alternatively spelled and pronounced Ugaki Kazushige and nicknamed Ugaki Issei) conceived a counterintelligence operation that was originally intended to develop an international spy net to restore Japan’s security establishment. Ugaki was leading a strong faction within Japan’s underground militarist movement of which Arisue was a principal member.
The operation was repackaged and proposed to Willoughby by Arisue in April 1949, having been codenamed ‘Takematsu’ by G-2. It entailed SCAP financing for Japanese agents to provide intelligence on foreign targets ("Take") and also gather domestic intelligence, primarily on communist elements in Japan ("Matsu").
Arisue and Kawabe, along with their respective kikan (subordinate group of functionaries/ assets), were involved in Operation Takematsu and only a restricted set of G-2 officers were aware of their activities. Willoughby himself was directly supervising them, placing an extraordinary amount of trust on both IJA veterans. These veterans were viewed with great concern by the CIA, which had managed to thoroughly document their duplicitous dealings (such as raising a Japan Volunteer Army with Kuomintang (KMT) support to counter the Communist Party of China (CPC)).
Colonel Arthur Lacey of G-2 was responsible for releasing necessary funds as supervisor of the 'Take' i.e. external component (he would later become head of SCAP's Civil Intelligence Division). Arisue et al justified high budgetary requests by insisting that the project would become self-sufficient due to involvement in smuggling work through Hokkaido etc and profit from phony trading companies.
Arisue and Kawabe would soon count three more contemporaries managing the operation: Lieutenant General Genshichi Oikawa (former Commander of IJA's 23rd Division in the Philippines), Major General Ryūkichi Tanaka (former Commandant of the infamous IJA Nakano School for military intelligence) and Colonel Takushirō Hattori (former Chief of IJA General Staff's Operations section).
The paradigm for operations under Operation Takematsu was replicated on the tried-and-tested model of 'commercial' special duty units, one of which (Mitsuboshi Trading Company) established in 1948 by Major General Watanabe Watanaru in Korea, China and Formosa (Taiwan) was operating successfully.
One of Arisue Kikan's achievements was the placement of spies posing as 'technical advisers' in the Indian and Pakistani governments. CIA reports from the time mention that Saigon (Vietnam) and Bangkok (Thailand) were coordination centres for operations in India, Burma, Malay and Pakistan (South and Southeast Asian zones).
While declassified CIA files fell short of specific details, examination of British Foreign Office and Australian Department of Trade & Agriculture archives help develop a more insightful picture of the time. In all, four SCAP trade delegations had visited Pakistan from 1948-49: The first led by R. Eaton in May 1948, Edward Brendan Blatchley in February 1949 and two back-to-back delegations in October 1949 led by B.W. Adams (Trade Procedures Branch Chief) and A.B. Snell (Machinery and Consumer Durable Goods Branch Chief).
The UK High Commissioner to Pakistan's monthly appreciation report for Commonwealth Relations Office (February 1949) records that the Blatchley-led delegation indeed visited Karachi to procure cotton and seek distributors for textiles and machinery. It notes, conspicuously, that the delegation included a radio engineer and one hydro-electric engineer to serve as 'technical advisers'. Apparently, deception pieces were planted in the Japanese press, later reprinted in Pakistan, that Tokyo had 'virtually concluded' an order for $1 million worth of broadcasting i.e. and generating i.e. power equipment.
There are strong reasons to suspect that both these Japanese 'advisers' were in fact Arisue kinkan operatives who were supported through fake media reports because a subsequent appreciation report from the UK High Commissioner (March 1949) reveals that the Blatchley-led mission had been "forced to scale down the quantities involved" due to "Japanese failure"; the two delegates may have decided to end their bluff by (possibly) citing miscoordination or personal incompetence.
The Blatchley delegation's visit predates Arisue's reported initiation of Takematsu, but CIA records confirm that he was nonetheless part of the SCAP G-2. One other reason to doubt the legitimacy (or sincerity) of Japanese technical assistance is the fact that Radio Pakistan's Chief Engineer, Riaz Ahmad, had already been sent for shopping to the US and UK for radio transmitters and equipment in October 1947; post World War II, the US and UK had replaced Netherlands and Germany as major suppliers of these items. Furthermore, despite its dilapidated infrastructure, then capital Karachi had managed to setup a basic radio station in 1948 inside a barrack of No. 6 Intelligence School.
Keeping SCAP trade conditions in mind, it is difficult to imagine that MacArthur's staff would allot clearance for export of technologies that could have competed against American offerings (Ahmad would go on another shopping visit in 1951, but exclusively to the US. Post-Occupation Japan, however, began supporting the upgradation of aging Radio Pakistan equipment).
It is also entirely possible that SCAP trade delegations led later by Adam and Snell may have also facilitated the infiltration of G-2 operatives. It is worth mentioning here that although Pakistan-Japan diplomatic relations were formally established in 1952, a trade office was already functioning in Karachi since 1948.
Eventually, the entire operation turned out to be a ruse to con US paymasters since only limited actionable intelligence was coming in from Takematsu's prongs throughout South, Southeast and East Asia. Michael Petersen describes the endeavour as "an elaborate scam".
Contextual logic also questions the wisdom behind infiltration in Pakistan. Unlike India, which established diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime in 1948, Pakistan and KMT-led Republic of China were almost indifferent to each other. Pakistan's policymakers had already expressed opposition to Communism but with great irony would, in 1949, recognise the Mao/ CPC-led People's Republic of China (PRC). There was practically little to offer from Pakistan in terms of intelligence vis à vis civil-war rife China, unless it was assumed that Stalin's Russia would provide a buffer zone for Mao's CPC from Zahir Shah of Afghanistan.
These prospects themselves were farfetched, because although Stalin was supporting Mao since the late 1920s, he was careful not to imbalance ties with the KMT, a fact that Mao always resented. Nor was Shah overtly appeasing to USSR's geopolitical whims.
The most plausible explanation appears to be that the Takematsu operatives may have been tasked to keep watch on the Communist Party of India (CPI) and its newly-formed offshoot in 1948, the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP). The question remains, why these newly-liberated countries of South Asia in particular? Geography/ shared land borders with China may have played a role in determining this initiative.
Examination of historical archives raises questions about the role of US patronage for these endeavours. Unlike Indochina, Korea or China where Communism was politically and/ or militarily gaining ground, Pakistan (and for that matter India too) was focused on refugee rehabilitation and economic recovery.
References
'Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community' by Richard J. Samuels
'The Command Structure: AFPAC, FEC and SCAP', US Army, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1%20sup/ch3.htm
'Nazi War Crimes (P.L. 105-246) and Japanese Imperial Government (P.L. 106-567) Disclosure Acts', Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 519cd81b993294098d516296, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/ARISUE%2C%20SEIZO_0008.pdf
'Nazi War Crimes (P.L. 105-246) and Japanese Imperial Government (P.L. 106-567) Disclosure Acts', Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 519cd81b993294098d516292, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/ARISUE%2C%20SEIZO_0011.pdf
'Nazi War Crimes (P.L. 105-246) and Japanese Imperial Government (P.L. 106-567) Disclosure Acts', Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 519cd81b993294098d516180, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/MAEDA%2C%20MINORU_0017.pdf
'Nazi War Crimes (P.L. 105-246) and Japanese Imperial Government (P.L. 106-567) Disclosure Acts', Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 519cd81f993294098d5167f0, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/KODAMA%2C%20YOSHIO%20%20%20VOL.%201_0059.pdf
‘Researching Japanese War Crimes Records’ by Edward Drea et al, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/introductory-essays.pdf
US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Meyers, 'A History of Socio-Cultural Intelligence and Research under the Occupation of Japan', US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11696
'Monthly Appreciation of the General Situation by the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Karachi No. 2 for February 1949', published in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print Part IV From 1946 through 1950 - Series E, Asia, Volume 9, https://books.google.com.pk/books/download/British_Documents_on_Foreign_Affairs.pdf
'Monthly Appreciation of the General Situation by the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Karachi No. 3 for March 1949', published in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print Part IV From 1946 through 1950 - Series E, Asia, Volume 9, https://books.google.com.pk/books/download/British_Documents_on_Foreign_Affairs.pdf
'Foreign Commerce Weekly', Vol. XXVII No. 11 dated 14 June 1947, US Department of Commerce, https://books.google.com.pk/books/download/Foreign_Commerce_Weekly.pdf?id=SxciAQAAMAAJ&output=pdf
'Foreign Trade: The Quarter Open Door', TIME, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,801780,00.html
'Bronxville Review Press and Reporter' dated 22 December 1960, https://news.hrvh.org/veridian/?a=d&d=bronxvillereviewpressreporterBRONXVILLE19601222.1.13&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN-------
'Overseas Trading' Vol. 2 Jul-Aug 1948, Australian Department of Commerce and Agriculture, https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-921472634/view?sectionId=nla.obj-925183452&partId=nla.obj-921490651#page/n19/mode/1up
'Pakistan-Japan Relations: Continuity and Change in Economic Relations and Security Interests' by Ahmad Rashid Malik
'A History of Radio Pakistan' by Nihal Ahmad
M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, 'America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership', International Studies Vol. 8, Issue 1-2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1177/002088176600800105
'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Vol. III 845F.51/11-2847, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v03/d117
Anwar Mehmood Khan and Asma Afzal, 'Pakistan-US Relations: Looking Beyond War on Terrorism', Government College University Lahore, Journal of Political Science, http://ps.gcu.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Prof.-Anwar-Mahmood-Khan.pdf
'India-Pakistan SR-21', CIA, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-01617A001600010001-2.pdf
Muhammad Tariq and Adnan Saleem, 'Early Days of Sino-Pakistan Relations', South Asian Studies Journal, University of the Punjab Vol. 36 No. 2, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/15_36_2_21.pdf